THE NEW ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE ACT

PASSAGE

CHARLES E. CLARK*

of a new practice act controlling the civil procedure in the

courts of the State of Illinois is an event of major importance not
only in the jurisprudence of the state but also in the procedural
history of the nation. The wave of reform of court procedure, which originated in New York in the middle of the last century and spread to a majority of the states, seemed to have dispelled itself some years ago so far
as major changes in an entire state code were concerned. Recent procedural developments have been limited in the main to the perfection of
special devices such as the summary judgment, the declaratory judgment
and discovery before trial.' The adoption of a new practice in one of our
great states is therefore notable particularly when that state is the one
long regarded as the outstanding stronghold of the ancient forms-the example to which law professors might still point of the enduring importance
of common law pleading.2
The invitation of the editors of the University of Chicago Law Review
to comment upon this new Act has caused me not a little trepidation. One
not immediately familiar with local practice cannot warn bench and bar
of pitfalls so well as can local authors. The clear statement already published in this review and the announcement of at least one new and authoritative book on the Act by authors not only highly competent, but at least
* Dean, Yale University School of Law.

The adoption of a new civil practice act in New York in I92o, effective in 1921, which was
most disappointing in its limitations, does not call for modification of the text. For citations
concerning the history and effect of this act see my book on Code Pleading (i928), 25-27.
Changes in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey have been more extensive, ibid. 21, 22;
E. R. Sunderland, The New Michigan Court Rules, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 586 (1931).
2 "It is an old story how Lord Chief Justice Russell felicitated the lawyers of Illinois forty
years ago, when he was guest at a Chicago reception, on the fact that their state had provided
the only park in the world for the preservation of ancient species of pleading and procedure."
Illinois Procedure Goes Modern, 17 Am. Jud. Soc. J. 40 (i933). This is not, however, a characterization entirely fair and there is much in the statement of ex-Chief Justice Floyd E.
Thompson to the Illinois lawyers that they had been practicing "code practice" ever since they
practiced law. Rep. Ill. St. Bar Ass'n, 1932, 269. In fact the former provision, Ill. Rev. St.
1931, c. 11o, § 40, for transfer of a case from law to chancery or vice versa, where a party has
misconceived his remedy, may turn out to have been as broad as the new provision in C. P. A.
Sec. 44 (2), discussed below.
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partly responsible for its drafting, will supply this need of the profession. 3
I concluded, therefore, that I should attempt rather some appraisal of the
Act against the general background of procedural reform in this country
and England. I realize even here the danger of criticism which may not be
justified in view of local conditions of which I am not informed. What may
have been a wholly justifiable compromise in view of political or other
difficulties may strike an outsider, not familiar with the campaign strategy, as unfortunate. The published history of the legislative movement is
unfortunately all too brief. We are told that at least four different drafts
were prepared. 4 Two of the earlier ones have been available s as well as
the report of the discussion before the state bar association. 6 All of this,
however, leaves much to be desired in any attempt to learn the complete
story. One wonders, for example, why the quite satisfactory and simple
provisions for the declaratory judgment, now so thoroughly established
as a desirable procedural device, were omitted from the statute apparently
at the last moment.7 But after all it may be worth while to consider the
Act apart from the necessities of the moment attending its passage and in
the light of its long-time value.
It should be said at once that the Act contains many and most valuable
procedural improvements. Thus the liberal provisions for joinder of actions, including joinder of parties and of causes of actions and the pleading
of counterclaims, which provide for practically unlimited joinder within
the bounds of trial convenience, are as enlightened as any in the country
and compare favorably with the English rules. The sections providing for
waiver of jury trial by failure to make claim therefor, for summary judg3 A. E. Jenner, Jr., and Walter V. Schaefer, The Proposed Illinois Civil Practice Act, i
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 49-71 (1933); Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated, 0. L. McCaskill, editor, and Messrs. Jenner and Schaefer, associate editors, announced for December 1, 1933.
4

See Jenner and Schaefer, op. cit., supra, note 3.

5 The draft, Proposed Consolidated Civil Practice Act, submitted by the Committee on
Judicial Administration of the Illinois State Bar Association for the consideration of the bench
and bar, hereinafter called Original Draft; and the bill presented to the Legislature in 1933,
Senate Bill No. 359, hereinafter called the Bill.
6 Rep. Illinois St. Bar Ass'n, 1932, 316-326.

provisions appear as Section 3o of the Original Draft and Section 58 of the Bill and
are discussed by Jenner and Schaefer, op. cit., supra,note 3. Meanwhile the United States Supreme Court, by consenting to review a Tennessee declaratory judgment and affirming its
validity, had removed the last obstacle (occasioned by earlier expressions of the same court)
to the complete acceptance of the remedy. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v.
Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345 (1933); 1 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 132 (i933); 46 Harv. L.
7 The

Rev. 85o (1933); 31 Mich. L. Rev. 7I0 (i933); 42 Yale L. Jour. 974 (i933).
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ments, 8 and for examination of parties and discovery of documents before
trial are admirable, as are the more liberal rules regarding service of process and the speeding up of the time for returning process and securing review and the system of control and of restriction of the granting of continuances. The various steps taken towards simplification of appellate
practice-referred to hereinafter more at length-are, if not revolutionary,
at least steps in the right direction. So is also the grant of certain, although
unfortunately incomplete, rule-making authority to the Illinois Supreme
Court. Making all due allowances, however, for substantial gains, one
cannot avoid regret that an act in many ways so extensive in character
and so upsetting to the present settled habits of bench and bar did not
go still further to establish an outstanding system of practice. Members
of the profession will now find that they must adjust themselves to an
essentially new procedure. There would have been no additional hardship in going the complete distance in the way of reform.
A major difficulty, it is feared, will be found in the gingerliness, not to
say timidity, with which the draftsmen have approached the fundamental
question of the abolition of forms of action and the union of law and equity. In their basic enactment they seem to say that only the nomenclature of the forms of actions is dispensed with, while separate procedures
in law and equity are to be maintained. On the other hand, provisions
later for free joinder of all sorts of claims and for the shifting of actions
from one docket to another are at war with such a purpose. The conflict
in point of view contains seeds of much trouble. One can hope that the
Illinois judiciary will ignore the blind provisions as to the abolition of
forms and will achieve a simplified procedure through whole-hearted application of the joinder rules. Unfortunately experience elsewhere teaches
us that the weight of past practice and precedents usually holds the courts
back from giving early and complete effect to practice reforms. The announced rules ought to be the ideal, abreast if not ahead of the actual experience. In the present instance, however, a bold judiciary must be relied
on to go further than do the legislators.
8The provisions for summary judgment (sections 57, 102), good as far as they go, are still
overrestricted in the kinds of actions to which they apply, in the lack of definite authority to the
court to decide questions of law on the summary proceedings, and in the lack of authority to
grant such judgments to defendants. See Finch, Summary Judgment Procedure, ig Am. Bar
Ass'n. Jour. 504 (1933); Clark and Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 Yale L. Jour. 423
(1929). The motion to dismiss by the defendant on affidavit showing release, Statute of
Frauds, etc. of C. P. A., § 48, is taken from New York practice and is also desirable, though
apparently defendants rarely seek summary action.
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In this connection the thoroughgoing statements of the original New
York Code of 1848, the model for the practice in a majority of states,
should be compared with the new Illinois provisions. That Code, as
drafted by David Dudley Field and his associates, provided:
The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such
actions ahd suits heretofore existing, are abolished; and there shall be in the state,
hereafter, but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights
and the redress or prevention of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil

action.9
Whereas Section 31 of the Illinois Act states that:
Neither the names heretofore used to distinguish the different ordinary actions at
law, nor any formal requisites heretofore appertaining to the manner of pleading in
such sections respectively, shall hereafter be deemed necessary or appropriate, and
there shall be no distinctions respecting the manner of pleading between such actions
at law and suits in equity, other than those specified in this Act and the rules adopted
pursuant thereto; but this section shall not be deemed to effect in any way the substantial averments of fact necessary to state any cause of action either at law or in
equity.
In the first statute the announced purpose is to blot out the distinctions
between the actions and achieve one single form; in the second it is only to
dispense with the necessity of names and formal requisites, but with the
vitally important exception that separate actions at law and suits in equity
exist and only the distinction in the manner of pleading is abolished.
Moreover in Section 44 (2) of the Act there is a reference to "the law
docket" and "the equity docket" and provision is made for transferring an
action from one to the other, although in Rule 13 (Section 107) the clerk is
directed to maintain apparently a single trial court docket upon which appear all the cases. Section i makes the Act applicable, with certain specified exceptions, to "all civil proceedings, both at law and in equity," while
Section 9 (3)revivifies that grand old anachronism, "actions for injunctions to stay proceedings at law" which, appropriately, "shall be brought
in the county in which the proceedings at law are had."' 0
On the other hand, Section 38 and Section 44 (i) of the Act provide for
the filing of all counterclaims, including recoupments and cross-bills in
equity; while the latter section also authorizes the joining of "any causes
of action, whether legal or equitable or both," and provides that legal and
equitable issues may be tried together where no jury is employed. Section
9N.Y. Laws, 1848, c. 379, § 62. For the present form of the statute see N.Y. Civil Practice
Act, Art. i,§ 8, and Clark, Code Pleading (1928), 46, 47.
loUnder code practice, such injunctions (always suggesting an undignified contest between
separate arms of the same sovereign) are unnecessary, except perhaps in contests with tribunals
of other states or countries.
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43 provides for the filing of claims or defenses in the alternative and includes a reference to equitable defenses." It seems clear that in these sections it is expected that equitable and legal claims and defenses shall be
considered in the same action and apparently in the same cause of action2
and, where a jury is waived, shall be tried together. When these provisions
are coupled with that in Section 64 for automatic waiver of trial by jury
upon failure to make seasonable claim therefor, a fairly complete amalgamation may be obtained if the separate law and equity dockets can be
conveniently forgotten or subordinated to the purpose of achieving unity.
Amalgamation of law and equity and abolition of forms of action is often objected to on the grounds that legal and equitable remedies are inherently different and that our law of rights grew out of our law of remedies. This is true but not particularly apt or pertinent to the problem
how to get the issues in our modern cases most quickly and effectively
before the court. The daily grist of a trial court is composed largely of
contract and negligence cases wherein it little boots anyone to puzzle over
the ancient distinctions among debt, covenant, account and assumpsit,
general and special, or between trespass and case. In the more involved
cases concerning our complex commercial life involving corporations and
business trusts, debenture bonds and trust receipts, receiverships and reorganizations, and new and unprecedented state and federal legislation,
there is little occasion, at the issue-formulatingstage of the case, to go back
on historical excursions. Moreover where a judge is sitting without a
jury, as he does more and more when dockets become crowded and jury
waiver automatic, it is not going to help him much in deciding whether or
not to issue or continue an injunction to recall that once on a time there
was an historic struggle between Coke and Ellsmere in which equity triumphed. It is true that occasionally at the trial such historical study may
be apt and pertinent; but it should be made only when it is of actual importance. So the difference in form of trial between equity and law, so
much emphasized by our pleading pundits, may at times engage the
court's attention and call for a real determination after a claim for jury
trial is actually made. There is no occasion to consider this or others of
these historical difficulties as forming iron limitations within which the
pleadings must be held for fear of the occasional case which at trial may
11Subsection 4 of § 43, in requiring the affirmative pleading of various defenses including
fraud, makes no express distinction between equitable and legal defenses.
12 The advertisement for the new Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated (see supra, note 3)
states that there will be forms of a complaint in which legal and equitable claims are joined in
the same suit without working a merger, and forms of complaints where a joinder does work a
merger, affecting trial by jury.
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present the question. Too much fear has been expressed of dangers which
in most cases will not arise at all and which can be met and disposed of
without difficulty when they do arise. Thus the remote danger that a
possible litigant may at some time be deprived of his jury trial right by a
failure of the court to perceive some of the historical connotations of his
case is too unsubstantial a basis to justify ancient formalism in pleading
in all cases.
One must admit that the treatment of the.union of law and equity in
the state of its origin has not been designed to make the system seem attractive elsewhere. But it cannot be too strongly emphasized that it was
not the system but the resistance to it which has led to the unfortunate
situation in New York. In the classic phrase of Chief Justice Winslow of
Wisconsin: "The cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which the infant
code received from the New York judges is matter of history. They had
been bred under the common-law rules of pleading and taught to regard
that system as the perfection of logic, and they viewed with suspicion a
-system which was heralded as so simple that every man would be able to
draw his own pleadings. They proceeded by construction to impart into
the code rules and distinctions from the common-law system to such an
extent that in a few years they had practically so changed it that it could
hardly be recognized by its creators."' 3 Even within comparatively recent
years the Appellate Division of the First Department in New York City
has been dismissing cases because brought, as the court thought, by mistake, either "at law" or "in equity," when the dismissal meant only beginning the case over again in the same way in the same court. 14 But for
many years the Appellate Division courts of at least three of the four
New York departments had arrived at a sensible and workable interpretation of the Code, and this now seems to be the case in the First Department also under the leadership of the present able presiding judge, whose
understanding attitude towards -procedural matters makes his influence
13McArthur v. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, 567, 128 N.W. 445, 446, 33 L. R. A. (N.S.) 264, 266
(1911).
14 See discussion in Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 Col. L. Rev. I (1925); Clark,
Code Pleading (1928), 47 d seq. particularly cases cited in note 36 on p. 5o, also p. 7o, and
p. 182, note x56; also cases in Clark, i Cases on Pleading and Procedure (1930), 505-591,
notably cases cited on 526. See also Walsh, Equity (1930), 96-131; Walsh, Merger of Law and
Equity under Codes and Other Statutes, 6 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 157 (1929); Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 Yale L. Jour. 645 (1923); Clark, Trial of Actions under the Code, ii Corn. L. Q. 482
(1926); Rothschild, 27 Col. L. Rev. 258, 262-265 (1927); 37 Yale L. Jour. 654, 661-666 (1928).
The contrast may be shown by Poth v. Washington Sq. M. E. Church, 207 App. Div. 219, 201
N.Y.S. 776 (1923) from the first department, with Port v. Holzinger, 212 App. Div. 124, 208
N.Y.S. 287 (1925) from the second department.
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most potent for efficient court administration.Y- Meanwhile in many, and
apparently most, of the code states, including those as widely separated
as Connecticut and California, a simple and effective system has been
worked out where the pleading stage of trial is not controlled by the ancient separation of law and equity. 6 Often where the amount of litigation
warrants it a mere division of trial calendars into jury cases and court or
jury-waived cases is a business-like means of classification preparatory to
assignment for trial; but no other or different distinction is necessary or
should be made.
Any attempt to preserve the ancient distinctions is therefore an efficient trouble-maker rendering the procedure uncertain, and, where really
enforced, leading to anomalous results in the dismissal of cases, disgraceful to any system which purports to administer justice. 7 It may be hoped,
therefore, that the Illinois judges will seize on the opportunity afforded by
the joinder provisions, referred to above, to avoid such a result.
The hesitation shown by the legislators in approaching this vital problem goes back to the Original Draft of the Bar Association, where these
provisions, though somewhat different in wording and arrangement, contained substantially the final limitations.'8 Another guarded change of
similar import was, however, subjected to restrictions only while the drafts
were under consideration. The Original Draft in Section 24 contained the
provision, taken from code practice, that actions "may be brought in the
75
Compare his leadership in extension of the summary judgment, Finch, op. cit., supra,
note 8.
16See articles cited in note 14, supra. Among many authorities the following are examples,
White v. Lyons, 42 Cal. 279 (1871); Thiel v. Miller, 122 Wash. 52, 209 Pac. 1O8i, 26 A.L.R.
523 (1922); Rath v. Wilgus, iio Neb. 8io, i95 N. W. i5 (1923); Bisnovich v. British America
Assur. Co., ioo Conn. 240, 248-250, 123 Atl. 339, 341-2 (1924); Gest v. Gest, 167 Ati. 9o9
(Conn. 1933) (saying that where a jury is present the better practice is to submit all issues to
it, the court upon their findings to grant the proper relief). Where, however, the parties are
definitely at odds as to whether a trial by jury may be had as of right, the court must decide
the question looking to the nature of the issues and the historical mode of trial. Rey v. Moore,
85 Conn. 159, 82 Ati. 233 (1912).
17 See the New York cases referred to in note 14, supra, and compare Glaser v. Columbia
Laboratories, Inc., r67 Ati. 201 (N.J. 1933) (partial assignment "unenforceable at law"); San
Giacomo v. Oration Inv. Co., 143 Atl. 329 (N.J. 1928) ("legal" question as to whether complainant might collect interest on an overdue mortgage debt not within the jurisdiction of chancery).
is Section 33 of the Original Draft provided: "No distinctions of form need be observed between the different ordinary actions at law, and there shall be no further distinctions of form
between actions at law and suits in equity than those indicated in this act and the rules adopted
pursuant thereto." A final paragraph of the same section contained the substance of what is
now Section 44 (2) providing for the transfer of actions between "law docket" and "equity
docket." In fact the wording of the Act here is more general than that of the Draft. The latter
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name of the real party in interest," and, to avoid all question, there was
added "or in the name of the holder of the legal title to the right asserted
or in the names of both." This explicit statement avoided the difficulty
experienced in some of the early code cases, where the courts, misled by
the word "real," held that only a beneficial owner might sue and thus refused recovery to an assignee for collection only. The true construction,
however, that no change in fundamental rights was intended by the code
reform and that anyone having a recognized jural right might sue 19 has
long been generally established and was affirmed in this provision. But
it was omitted by the Bill before the legislature, which contained only the
former law that the assignee and owner of a non-negotiable chose in action
may sue in his own name, and this was later amended to include the former
statutory requirement in full 2° so that such a plaintiff "shall in his pleading
on oath, allege that he is the actual bona fide owner thereof, and set forth
how and when he acquired title."'" Thus is reenacted the harsh Illinois
rule that an assignee for collection only cannot sue. 2 There seems no reason why the simple and convenient business practice of transferring
claims merely for the purpose of collection should be objected to, or why
the courts should be placed in the position of aiding a defendant in making
a highly technical defense. The Original Draft was much to be pre3
ferred.2
An advantage claimed for the new Practice Act is that it does away with
"blind pleadings."24 This apparently is to be achieved under various sections requiring the pleadings to be specific, notably, Section 40, which
also does away with the general issue. Carrying out this plan Section 35,
2

authorizes the transfer of "any action or counterclaim in equity" on the "law docket" and of
"any action or counterclaim at law" on the "chancery docket," while the former permits the
transfer of "any cause of action or counterclaim." The Bill and the Act are identical. For a
protest made by a member of the bar against even a limited change, see Illinois State Bar Ass'n
Rep. 1932, 321. But protests from the bar as to changes in established practice must unfortunately always be expected. Compare Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1926); Clark, Code Pleading (1928), 27, 35.
x' See Manley v. Park, 68 Kan. 400, 75 Pac. 557, 66 L. R. A. 967, r Ann. Cas. 832 (1902)
overruling Stewart v. Price, 64 Kan. i91, 67 Pac. 553, 64 L. R. A. 58I (1902). But see Brown
v. Ginn, 66 Ohio St. 316, 64 N. E. 123 (1902). Cf. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), 96, ioo.
C
l
Civil Practice Act, § 22.
20Ill. Rev. St. 1931, c. 110, § 19.
"Gallagher v. Schmidt, 313 111.40,:44 N. E. 319 (924) reversing 23x Ill. App. 168 (1923).
23Like provisions in the same section control action for the subrogee, the action to be
brought "either in the name of, or for the use of the subrogee," an expression reminiscent of
common law pleading.
24 Jenner and Schaefer, op. cit., supra,note 3. Compare Sunderland, The Civil Practice Act
of x933 (introduction to the Act in Cahill's Revised Statutes, i933).
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like the original New York Code, provides that a party by verifying his
own pleadings may force all later pleading to be supported by oath. One
may perhaps doubt whether the purpose in mind has been achieved in the
Act and further how desirable it in fact is. It may be recalled that the
first fruit of the agitation for pleading reform in England was the adoption
of the Hilary Rules of 1834. The man primarily charged with the drafting
of these rules was quite naturally that pleading master, Stephen, whose
crime it was that he made common law pleading seem simple and attractive. His view of reform was to have more, much more, and stricter pleading. Hence the Hilary Rules limited very greatly the effect of the general
issue and called for precise and specific allegations and denials. At no
time in the history of our law has pleading been as technical or as difficult
or destructive of the rights of innocent litigants as in the decade or two
after these rules were adopted and before changes going in the opposite
direction were made. Professor Holdsworth in a notable article has pointed out some of the results upon our law in bringing alive old technicalities
and in turning the current of even substantive law into ancient and arbitrary channels. 2- We are not likely to repeat that experience for the reason
that we, unlike Baron Parke and his colleagues, lack the courage of our
convictions so that we will not penalize a pleader by the only effective
sanction there is for such rules, namely, loss of the case. Such a harsh
penalty for ignorance, carelessness or, perhaps more often, justifiable uncertainty is properly abhorrent to our sense of justice. At most we may
occasionally-very occasionally-attempt to apply the ineffective punishment of taxing extra costs,26 but generally we shall only spend time and
energy in a profitless endeavor to perfect the written record, or to exhort
the parties to do so, while they successively, though not concurrently, resist our efforts.
The fact of the matter is that such an attitude represents an attempt
to assign to the formal pleadings a role they are actually not fitted to fill.
It is true that the code ideal was to "plead the facts," but in experience
this was the least successful part of the code reform.2 7 The parties will not
2SHoldsworth, The New Rules of Pleading of the Hilary Term, i Camb. L. Jour. 26r
Cf. Reppy, The Hilary Rules and Their Effect on Negative and Affirmative Pleas
under Modem Codes and Practice Acts, 6 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 95 (x929).
26 The Illinois provision, C. P. A. § 41, seems singularly weak; "such reasonable expenses
.... as may have been actually incurred by the other party, by reason of such untrue pleading." The difficulty and usual impossibility of enforcing a penalty under such a rule may be
perceived.
27 Cf. Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading under the Codes, 21 Col. L. Rev. 416 (1921);
Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 Yale L. Jour. 259 (1926).
(1923).
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reveal their entire stories until the time comes when such revelation is
necessary and worthwhile. That in the usual case is at the actual trial or,
when the modern procedural short cuts of summary judgment, examination, and discovery are used, it is at the affidavit or examination stage of
the proceedings.28 At these times the whole case will be brought out because here failure of a party to disclose is followed by loss of the case. The
pleadings in reality are only the more or less. standardized and formal
statements which define broadly the ultimate boundaries of the litigation.
They are important and helpful in so doing, for they permit of early sorting and classification of types of cases preparatory to disposing of them
quickly and efficiently. Here in fact is probably the greatest opportunity
for advance in effective law administration-increased use of sorting
techniques looking to more effective case disposition. The summary judgment and the other new devices are first steps which should be followed
by careful study and test of others. The pleadings in addition provide the
formal basis for the ultimate judgment and thus define the limits of its
later application both on appeal and as res judicata. They are important,
but they are not the evidence or the proof of the case and efforts to make
them a substitute therefor seem doomed to futility. Generally in this
country, therefore, the attempts to do away with the use of the common
counts in the complaint, or to dispense with the general denial or to make
the verification of pleadings of any real significance in the case have not
succeeded.
Hence while admonition to pleaders to set forth their facts precisely
may be not out of place in a code as counsels of ideals to be followed and
as aids to making the pleadings more effective for their actual purposes,
yet time-tried and effective short cuts such as the common counts and the
general denial should not be frowned upon. Nor should the courts be commanded to waste much effort in polishing up the formal allegations.
Rather should they be encouraged to devote their attention to the application of the modern substitutes for the time-consuming trial, and to extend the usefulness of the summary judgment and other like devices.
The explicit direction in the Act that certain named defenses, such as
payment, release, fraud, and the like, must be affirmatively pleaded sensibly carries out this view and removes the manner of raising these issues
29
from the uncertainty which often surrounds them in code practice.
28See supra, note 8.
29C. P. A. § 43. The catch-all phases at the end, referring to defenses "which by other
affirmative matter seeks to avoid the legal effect of or defeat" the plaintiff's case (a perfect circle-affirmative defenses must be pleaded as affirmative defenses) and defenses "likely to take
the opposite party by surprise" are not illuminating; though perhaps some generality is called
for here to give the court scope to apply the rule to analogous cases.
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Other desirable pleading changes incorporated in the Act cannot be discussed in detail. They include clear provisions as to the office and effect
of the prayer for relief;30 authority for pleading in the alternative; 3' for
pleading together defenses to the jurisdiction, in abatement and in bar;32
and for entering split judgments for or against various of the parties;33
and, with respect to amendments, the continuance and extension of the
Act of 1929, which did away with an unusually illiberal earlier rule restricting their grant. 34 The provision abolishing demurrers is in line with
modern reform, but it is doubtful if the purpose is achieved by merely
substituting a motion therefor. The English practice of the "objection in
law," which is heard before the trial only when the court concludes that a
decision upon it will substantially dispose of the whole action, 3S is preferable since it does away with the dilatory results of an extra stage of argument and ruling, not determinative of the case. The motion unfortunately
does not avoid this chief objection to the demurrer.
On matters of appellate review, the Act is limited to improving the
mechanics of review and does not introduce any innovations beyond the
usual rules of most states. In fact the improvements here adopted should
have been made before as they correct technicalities which were needlessly
encumbering Illinois appellate procedure.
With respect to the jurisdiction or scope of appellate review no change
is made. As to cases which go from the appellate court to the Supreme
Court, the former by issuing a certificate of importance may still certify
questions to the highest court, while that court may order the intermediate appellate tribunal to send a cause to it for review by "leave to
36
appeal," equivalent, except for the name, to the former certiorari.
The primary change in method is to substitute a broader appeal for the
30 § 34, providing that the prayer for relief does not limit the relief, except in cases of default,
thereby avoiding a pitfall of many codes which limit the relief ambiguously to the case where the
defendant has not answered. Clark, Code Pleading (1928), 179-187. The Illinois section also
makes provision designed to protect a party against prejudice by reason of surprise on claims
for other relief.
3 §§ 34 and 43 (2); also §§ 23, 24 as to joining parties in the alternative.
32§ 43 (3).
33§ So. This is usual under code practice, but this statute contains special provisions avoiding the discharge of a joint contractor by a judgment against his co-contractor.
34Laws 1929, p. 578, Rev. St. 1931, c. 11o, § 39. For the previous rule which was based on
a narrow construction of cause of action and which effectively prevented even slight amendments after the statute of limitations had run, see N. & G. Taylor Co. v. Anderson, 275 U.S.
431, 48 Sup. Ct. 144, 72 L. Ed. 354 (1928); 36 Yale L. Jour. 852 (1927); 22 Ill. L. Rev. 3o9
(1927); 4 Ill. L. Rev. 344 (igog).
35 English Rules under judicature Act, Order 25, Rules 1-4.
36Illinois C. P. A. §§ 75, 77, 78: § 1io (rule 16).
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former methods of review, notably the appeal and the writ of error.37 It
has been unfortunate that these two methods, largely overlapping but the
exactlimitsof whichhave not been wholly dear,35 should have existed to the
confusion of bench and bar, and the attempted simplification is most desirable. Unfortunately since certain specific actions are not changed by
the Act, there may still be cases where the older forms of review must be
employed, and there is even a possible constitutional question whether
writ of error can be abolished or its identity changed or lost.3 9 It is to be
hoped, however, that these difficulties can be met in such way as not to
limit the real reform intended.
Another important step has been taken in connection with the record on
appeal. Formerly the preparation of the record was a serious and difficult
if not disastrous matter for appellants. A sharp distinction was recognized between the record proper (the old common law record) and the
transcript of proceedings in the trial itself, usually called a "certificate of
evidence" in equity and a "bill of exceptions" in common law proceedings.
It was often not clear when a paper should be in the record and when in the
transcript, but if counsel made a mistake, the document was not regarded
as before the court even though it appeared in some other place in the appeal record. 4° All distinctions between parts of the record are now abolished and all documents before the court on appeal may hereafter be con4
sidered by the court for all purposes. '
Important practical changes have been made with reference to findings
of fact. Heretofore the statute has required the Appellate Court, where it
finds any facts different from those found by the trial court, to make a
formal recital in its final order of the facts found. Now it is also stated
that this court's final order shall not be reversed by the Supreme Court
37 Illinois C. P. A. § 74 et seq.
38 The distinctions which have existed between the appeal and the writ of error are summarized in Dodd and Edmunds, Illinois Appellate Procedure (1929), § I8o. The appeal was in
many ways a simpler and more flexible proceeding which must be promptly taken and bond
given; while the writ was a new action brought by parties perhaps not of record and without
giving bond, any time within two years. The new plan is an attempt to unite the advantages of
each with a much shorter period than the old writ-ninety days-but subject to some extension by the court for cause. C. P. A. § 76. The time allowed for appeal still seems substantial,
if not excessive.
39 1 am indebted to my former colleague, Mr. Walter F. Dodd, of the Chicago bar, for many
suggestions as to the effect of the new Act on appellate procedure. He is, of course, not responsible for the use I have made of them nor for my conclusions.
40 Frank v. Chicago, 216 Ill. 587, 75 N. E. 213 (igo5); Jenner and Schaefer, op. cit., supra,
note 3, 67.
4XIll.

C. P. A. § 74
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for failure to recite such facts if they sufficiently appear in the opinion or
in the order or from an examination of the two. 4' Thus is avoided a reversal for this technical mistake not affecting substantive rights. It is
further provided that in cases tried without a jury no special findings of
43
fact by the trial court are necessary to support the judgment or decree.
This is particularly valuable as changing the rule previously applied in
chancery cases that the decree must recite every fact necessary to support
it, a rule placing the burden of supporting the decree upon the court making it, and hence upon the successful party, whereas the burden of making
the record on review ought to be on the person launching the attack.
In general, however, no change has been made in the power of the appellate tribunals to review facts. This means, as heretofore, that the Appellate Courts have broad powers to review facts, limfied somewhat in
jury cases, and that the Supreme Court has like powers in all chancery
cases and in cases coming to it directly but not in cases coming from the
Appellate Courts. 44 The matter of the extent of the review of facts is a
troublesome one in appellate procedure generally, but in view of the
general scope of the new Act it is not surprising that no change was attempted. Moreover, the attitude expressed in the Act against a complete
amalgamation of law and equity indicated that the old chancery review
would be preserved. This is unfortunate. There seems no reason, except
the historical one which should no longer be determinative, why review of
jury-waived cases and review of chancery cases should differ. Not only is
the resulting confusion unnecessary, but such a distinction has unfortunate results beyond the appellate courts in tending to induce the trial
courts to enforce the division even back at the stage of pleading and before it is clear that there will be a trial, much less an appeal. The rule
adopted in many, though not all, the code states, of a chancery review
4
limited just as is a legal review, seems preferable. '
Whether American courts should go further and attempt to dispense
with the distinction between fact and law is a real prbblem. The distinction is a most unmanageable one, since there is no clear cut line between
42 C.

P. A. § 89, extending Rev. St. 1931,

C.

110, § i 9 .

C. P. A. § 64, subdivisions (2) and (3).
44 C. P. A. § 92 (b); Dodd and Edmunds, Illinois Appellate Procedure (1929), C. 29, and
especially § 114.
45 See New Mexico, Code ig5, §§ 4197, 4507; Fraser v. State Say. Bank, i8 N. M. 340, 137
43

Pac. 592 .(913); Meriden Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Miller, 88 Conn. 157, 9o Ad. 228
(i915); Berry v. Merrill, i6i At. 34 (N.H. 1932). But see Carroll v. Bullock, 207 N.Y. 567,

ioi N. E. 438 (i913); Campbell v. Gowans, 35 Utah 268, ioo Pac. 397,
i9 Ann. Cas. 66o (rgog).
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the two concepts; and appellate practice is confused and uncertain because the reviewing court seems often to take jurisdiction or not, as it
chooses, and only rationalizes the result by applying the label of law or
fact as it needs. 46 On the other hand, even without constitutional limitations on review of facts, all courts of review properly wish to avoid the
regular examination of testimony taken below. The trier of facts who has
*observed the witnesses can decide such questions better than the appellate tribunal, and the sheer drudgery facing the latter courts to no good
purpose is persuasive agreement for some limitation. But a more realistic
formulation of the test should be made, unless, indeed, we are prepared to
adopt the English system where the appeal is a rehearing and not a search
for error. Much is to be said for this plan which, in the first instance, at
least as applied to the English Court of Appeals, 47 calls for an examination
of the entire case below with additional testimony if necessary with the
objective of entering whatever judgment the case requires.48 Along with
this should go, however, the simple English system of not having the
formal and formidable printed record, but of furnishing the appellate
court with special copies of all documents together with the trial judge's
notes of the evidence (and more rarely a transcript of the evidence).49
Such simplicity is most desirable; it may be prevented by appeal fees from
fostering improper appeals. It seems, however, not yet at least in line
with American conceptions of review.
Two provisions of the new Act do, however, look somewhat in the direction of the English position and may well be watched with much interest. One is the authority to the reviewing court to "give any judgment
and make any order which ought to have been given or made. ' 's° The
other is the power to grant amendments and receive further testimony in
46 The

Illinois experience in applying the distinction is apparently similar to that in other

Jurisdictions. Dodd and Edmunds, Illinois Appellate Procedure (X929), §§ 1-11-I13. Cf. Sunderland, The Scope of judicial Review, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 416 (1929); Tyler, The Finding of
Facts in Connecticut, 4 Conn. Bar Jour. 265 (193 o ) and suggestion to the Connecticut Judicial
Council of a modified form adopted from the English system. Second Report, Conn. Jud.
Council (1930), 94-1or. For discussions of the meaning of fact and law, see articles by Cook
and Clark cited supra, note 27.
47 The ultimate appeal to the House of Lords is made cumbersome, expensive, and difficult.
See next note.
48 Clark, English Appellate Procedure, 39 Yale L. Jour. 76, 86 (1929). Cf. Sunderland, op.
cit., supra, note 46.
49Ibid. See also Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 126, 139-148
(1927); 3 Univ. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 14-23 (1929).
so C. P. A. § 92 (d) also authorizing orders of partial reversal, partial new trial, remittur,
etc.
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the reviewing court.5 ' This power has been granted in a few American
jurisdictions and, while usually sparingly exercised as yet, may be the
2
means of avoiding an unfortunate and unnecessary further trial of a case.5
In the outstanding authority on Illinois appellate procedure, the authoritative volume by Messrs. Dodd and Edmunds, is a fine plea for a
complete study of appellate review in that state with a view to extensive
reform. 3 It is obvious that the plan of the draftsmen of the Act has been
more modest, and that more extensive reform must be postponed, while the
technical defects are being corrected by the Act. Moreover, though the
general problem is troubling many American states and some have tried
revamping of their systems, yet study and solution are still mainly in the
future.5 4 We may hope for much more expert advice on these matters, in
the future, but pending this the more limited objective of the Illinois Act
is understandable and justifiable.
In general summary one may say that the new Act, because of its
specific reforms and because of the possibilities for flexible construction
and enlightened application which it affords, deserves the support of
Illinois bench and bar. It corrects many specific defects and blemishes of
Illinois practice, and in some of its provisions, notably those on joinder of
actions, it offers means of achieving an unusually advanced system of civil
procedure.
s,C. P. A. § 92(a)-(d). The testimony may be received "where evidence has been erroneously excluded or where there has been an omission of proof at the trial of some facts, which, under
the circumstances of the case, may subsequently be proved without involving any question for
a jury and without substantial injustice to either party.
s2Scott, Fundamentals in Procedure (1922) 16o, 161, 167; Albertsworth, Procedural Reform, 7 Corn. L. Quar. 327 (1922); Clark, Code Pleading (1928), 36, 512; 38 Yale L. Jour. 398
(1929); 32 ibid. 5o6 (1923). For statutes as to taking testimony on appeal see Cal. Stats. of
1927, 583, C. C. P. § 956a; Kan. Rev. Stat. (1923), 60-3316; Mass. Gen. Laws (192X), C. 231,
§ 125; R. I. Gen. Laws (1923), c. 339, § 30; i6 Cal. L. Rev. o50(5928); 3 So. Cal. L. Rev. 355
(193o); Hummel v. Muller, 102 Cal. App. 474, 283 Pac. 87 (1929); Bankers Mtg. Co. v. Dole
i3o Kan. 647, 287 Pac. 9o6 (1930); Haynes v. Greene, 46 R. I. 32, 134 Atl. 853 (1926); 36 Yale
L. Jour. 570 (1926).
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and Edmunds, Illinois Appellate Procedure (1929), c. 37, especially § 1435.
the various suggestions and the limited change finally adopted in Connecticut.
Second Report of Conn. Judicial Council (193o) note 46, supra; Beers, Appeals and The New
Rules, 6 Conn. Bar Jour. 22 (1932). See also other citations in notes 46, 48, and 49, supra;
Third Report of Michigan Judicial Council 1933, Appendix: Study of the Organization and
Operation of Courts of Review by Curran and Sunderland, 51-246; Dodd, The Problem of
Appellate Courts, 6 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 68I (1930); Sunderland, Intermediate Appellate Courts,
S4 Compare

6 ibid. 613 (1930).

